Sudan’s War: Egypt, Turkey and Eritrea’s Regional Roles

 

Sudan’s War and the Regional Interests of Egypt, Turkey and Eritrea

Sudan’s ongoing war has developed into a regional security issue involving military partnerships, foreign weapons supplies and competing strategic interests across Northeast Africa. Since fighting erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), external relationships have become increasingly important to understanding the conflict. The European Union Agency for Asylum’s assessment of Sudan’s security situation documents the SAF’s close relationship with Egypt and the involvement of several external actors in the war.

Egypt and Sudan: Military Cooperation and Agricultural Interests

Egypt and Sudan have longstanding military, economic and political ties. Their shared border, Nile River interests and interconnected security concerns provide strong reasons for continued engagement between Cairo and Sudanese military authorities. The Council on Foreign Relations’ analysis of Sudan’s civil war identifies Egypt as an important regional supporter of the SAF, reflecting its strategic interest in Sudan’s stability and the balance of power in the region.

Alongside security cooperation, agriculture is an important part of the wider relationship between the two countries. Sudan possesses substantial agricultural potential, while Egypt faces significant pressure on its water and food resources. Research by Chatham House on the transnational nature of the conflict economy in Sudan and Ethiopia discusses connections between SAF-linked commercial networks, Egyptian military-affiliated businesses and agricultural commodity trading.

Against this background, allegations that al-Burhan has offered Sudanese agricultural land to Egypt in exchange for military backing deserve careful investigation. Such a claim would raise questions about land ownership, the allocation of agricultural concessions, the terms of any bilateral agreement and the relationship between commercial benefits and military assistance. However, the existence of a specific land-for-military-support agreement should not be assumed without verifiable documentation, credible independent reporting or confirmation from the parties involved.

Turkish Military Equipment and Supply Networks

Turkey has become relevant to the Sudan conflict through the use of Turkish-manufactured weapons and military technology. In July 2024, Amnesty International published an investigation into weapons fuelling Sudan’s conflict, identifying Turkish-made firearms and examining evidence concerning their presence among conflict participants. Its findings illustrate why arms transfers, export controls and the end users of military equipment require close scrutiny.

More recent reporting has examined the supply of advanced military technology to Sudan’s army. A Reuters investigation published in February 2026 reported the deployment of Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci combat drones at a remote Egyptian airstrip near Sudan. The report described Egypt’s longstanding political support for the SAF and reported logistical and technical assistance, while noting uncertainty about operational details.

These developments make the relationship between Turkish equipment, Egyptian territory and Sudan’s military capabilities an important subject for further research. Investigators should distinguish between confirmed equipment transfers, reported transit routes, suspected military logistics and allegations about the role of individual governments. Evidence of Turkish-made equipment in Sudan does not, on its own, establish that every shipment passed through Egypt or that every transfer was organised by the same network.

Eritrea and the Sudanese Armed Forces

Eritrea’s geographic position gives it significance in the security environment surrounding eastern Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa. Relationships between Eritrea and Sudanese military actors therefore deserve attention, particularly when assessing cross-border security, training arrangements and possible movements of military supplies.

A Chatham House analysis published in 2026 reported that Eritrea had hosted and trained pro-SAF militia in eastern Sudan. This reporting adds to the wider picture of regional involvement in Sudan’s conflict and highlights the importance of examining military cooperation beyond formal diplomatic statements.

The separate question of whether Eritrea has facilitated military supply deliveries connected to the Tigray front, allegedly with Egyptian support, requires additional evidence. In a recent report, the Associated Press covered Ethiopian military leadership’s accusations involving Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt. The accusations concerned alleged support for Tigrayan forces, but the report noted that evidence was not provided for the claims and that Eritrea and Sudan rejected Ethiopia’s allegations. These claims should therefore be treated as disputed, rather than proof of a coordinated supply operation.

Why the Regional Connections Matter

The involvement of neighbouring states and international suppliers complicates efforts to understand and resolve Sudan’s war. Military equipment can strengthen the operational capabilities of armed forces, while regional partnerships can create incentives for governments to maintain relationships with particular actors. At the same time, commercial ties involving agriculture, transport and strategic commodities may overlap with broader security interests. The European Union’s assessment of Sudan’s conflict examines the interests of external actors and the role of international support in shaping the conflict.

For neighbouring countries, the consequences extend beyond Sudan’s borders. Instability can increase displacement, disrupt trade, put pressure on border communities and heighten tensions over regional security. For international policymakers, the central questions include whether military transfers comply with applicable restrictions, whether allegations of external involvement can be independently verified, and whether diplomatic engagement can reduce the flow of weapons into the conflict.

What Needs to Be Verified

A rigorous assessment of these relationships requires several distinct lines of evidence. Any alleged agricultural land arrangement should be examined through land records, contracts, official statements and independent reporting. Claims about Turkish military equipment passing through Egypt should be assessed using shipment records, reliable investigative reporting and verifiable evidence about the equipment’s origin and destination. Allegations involving Eritrean supply routes toward Tigray require corroborated information about dates, locations, cargo and the actors involved.

These questions should not be treated as interchangeable. Evidence of longstanding Egypt–SAF cooperation does not establish a land-for-arms exchange, and evidence of Eritrean cooperation with SAF-aligned forces does not automatically prove Egyptian involvement in supplies to Tigray.

Sudan’s war is increasingly shaped by a network of regional interests that connects military cooperation, weapons procurement, commercial relationships and border security. Understanding those connections requires careful investigation and a clear distinction between documented facts, reported assessments and unverified allegations. That approach is essential for evaluating the conflict’s wider implications for Egypt, Turkey, Eritrea, Sudan and the stability of the Horn of Africa.